Multiple equilibria in bidding fee auctions by Castel-Branco, Miguel Moraes
Multiple Equilibria in Bidding Fee Auctions
by
Miguel Castel-Branco
Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree of




This dissertation presents a game theoretic approach to bidding fee auctions
with independent private values. I analyze these auctions under two bidding
window rules. In a sequential bidding auction the round moves forward imme-
diately after a bid was submitted. In a multiple round auction, the round moves
forward only after all players have submitted their action. Under the assump-
tion that the bidders may either have a low value or a high value for the object,
I show that multiple equilibria, with relevantly different characteristics, may
arise under either rule. Moreover, the rule that maximizes the seller’s revenue
depends on the the probability of a high value bidder.
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A lot of controversy has arisen in the past few years due to the increasing
popularity of bidding fee auctions, commonly known as penny auctions. These
auctions are made online, with (potentially) many bidders struggling for a good
(usually household objects, televisions, computers, gadgets, etc.). The first bid-
ding fee auction site, Telebid (later changed its name to Swoopo) appeared in
2005, in Germany, and it was an immediate success: in the first four years of
activity, its average revenues exceeded 150% of the goods retail price (Augen-
blick, 2011). However, such good results did not last long: Swoopo filed for
bankruptcy in March 2011, due to financial difficulties. Even though, the num-
ber of penny auctions sites continued to grow and, currently, there are more
than 500 allegedly penny auctions sites.
But how do these auctions work? A bidding fee auction usually has a timer
between ten seconds and five minutes. When a bid is placed, the timer resets
and the price goes up by a small amount (a penny). If no one bids before the
end of the bidding window, the last bidder wins, paying the current high bid.
In order to place a bid, bidders must pay a bidding fee.1
To illustrate how these auctions work, consider the auction of a television
set. Suppose that, at a given moment, the current high bid is $50.00. For
someone to outbid this value, she must bid $50.01, which has a fixed cost of
$1.00. People have 15 seconds to bid. If no-one bids until the timer reaches
zero, the current high bidder will be the auction’s winner, paying $50.00 for the
television set. This would give a $5050 revenue2 for the seller.
The fact that a bidder can spend a lot of money in the auction and still
lose it and the extremely high average revenues for the auctioneer brought this
new type of auctions to the attention of the media, comparing penny auctions
to online gambling (McCarthy, 2011). The criticism increased when it was
discovered that some sites were shill bidding, artificially increasing prices either
manually or through bot bidders in the auction script. PennyBiddr, another
penny auctions site, was shut down by the Washington State in 2010.3 Besides
1The bidding credits are bought in bundles of bids. Usually, the unit cost of a bid is lower
for larger bundles. In my model, I will ignore this, and assume the bidding marginal cost is
constant.






shill bidding, PennyBiddr was also allowing its programme to actually win the
auction, making it impossible for bidders to get the goods. The company was
keeping both the money spent in bids by the real bidders and the object, which
would be auctioned again.
Although there are no published papers on bidding fee auctions, several au-
thors have already been working on the topic. Byers et al. (2010) provide the
most complete analysis of penny auctions. They solve two general models: a
model of ascending price and a model of fixed price4 and extend their analysis
to an auction environment in which the number of bidders is uncertain. They
also model other types of asymmetries among the players: asymmetry in the
bidding cost (some bidders may have bought a greater bundle of bidding credits,
at a lower unit price), concluding that the existence of a group of bidders with
lower marginal bidding cost increases the expected profits of the auctioneer; and
asymmetry in the perceived common value of the item.5 They further include
shill bidding in the model, which unsurprisingly lowers the probability of en-
tering the auction and, consequently, the expected seller’s revenue; and they
also let an aggressive bidding behaviour6 by the bidders. Augenblick (2011)
presents a theoretical model and finds its Markov perfect equilibrium, in terms
of hazard rates, but focuses mainly on an empirical analysis, using data from
Swoopo. On the demand side, he shows that bidders tend to bid more, the
more financially committed they are to the auction (due to past bids), falling
for the sunk-cost fallacy. On the supply side, his paper concludes that entrants
tend to supply more auctions than it would be optimal in the short term, in
order to create a large user-base. This creates barriers to entry and justifies why
the profit margin is much higher for the market leader. Mittal (2010) provides
a theoretical model, also with the assumption that a bidder’s bidding decision
depends on the amount invested in bid costs. She gives the conditions for the
existence of symmetric equilibria and concludes that for sufficiently high bid-
ding fees, a bidding fee auction can generate higher revenues, while for bidding
fees approaching zero, the equilibrium would tend to the English auction’s. She
also states that the seller should expect higher revenues in excess of the object’s
4In this model, the price is fixed (i.e., there is no price increment).
5The last one approaches what I do, independently, in this dissertation, with the major
difference that they assume that a bidder perceives all rivals as having the same valuation as
herself.
6A bidder using an aggressive bidding strategy bids immediately whenever she is outbid,
to create a reputation that she will win the auction, no matter what.
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retail price for objects the value of which is some orders of magnitude greater
than the bidding fee. Platt et al. (2012) find that risk preferences play the most
important role in bidding behaviour and stress the similarities between penny
auctions and some forms of gambling. Because of that, this auction’s format
requires the most attention from the regulatory authorities. Hinnosaar (2010)
underlines the unpredictability of revenues in symmetric stationary subgame
perfect equilibria (players condition their actions on the current price and num-
ber of active bidders, instead of considering the whole history of bids), both for
standard penny auctions (with a strictly positive price increment) and for auc-
tions with zero price increment. The paper states that the variance of outcomes
is a characteristic of the auction format.
The high variance of outcomes, that has also been pointed out in the media
(McCarthy, 2011), motivates me to look for the existence of multiple equilibria
in bidding fee auctions. My dissertation describes a bidding fee auction model
of two players with independent private values. Byers et al. (2010), Hinnosaar
(2010), Mittal (2010), Augenblick (2011), Platt et al. (2012), all present common
value models, claiming that even though buyers may value the good differently,
they all have the retail price of the good as reference. I consider that there can
be bidders whose value is lower than the market price, and even though they
would not buy the good elsewhere, they might be interested in participating in
a penny auction to try to purchase it at a lower price. By using a private values’
model, I allow the existence of two groups of bidders: bidders whose values are
greater than the retail price of the good and bidders whose values are lower.
Another point where my work differs from the other authors’ is that I assume
leader proactivity, where they all assume leader passivity, meaning that the
owner of the current high bid is unable to bid. The leader passivity assumption
makes it simpler to look for symmetric equilibria. In my simple model, with only
two bidders, I am able to loose that assumption without major complications.
In an independent private values framework, it makes sense allowing the leader
to bid, since she may learn about her rivals’ values from observing their actions
in the preceding round.
In reality the price should move up immediately after someone bidding.
However if bidders bid almost simultaneously, they may not be able to instant-
aneously become aware of the price increase. Because of that, I provide two
variations of the same model, that differ on the bidding window rule. The se-
quential bidding auction admits that as soon as a bid is placed, bidders acknow-
ledge that they are in a different round. The multiple round bidding auction
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assumes that bidders are not able to instaneously see their rival’s action. An
auction with this rule is made of several rounds, in each of which all players can
submit a bid. A round will only give place to the following by the end of a given
time period.
In this dissertation, it is my aim to answer to the following questions: Can
bidding fee auctions have multiple perfect Bayesian equilibria?, Which bidding
window rule maximizes the seller revenue? and also Is it possible that bidding
fee auctions outperform standard auctions?
The dissertation is organized as follows: In Section 2, I describe a two-player
bidding fee auction model with independent private values. In Section 3, I solve
the sequential bidding auction. In Section 4, I solve the multiple round bidding
auction. In these two sections, besides deriving the equilibrium conditions, I
construct a parametrized example. Section 5 compares both auctions’ outcomes
and shows what would be optimal, from the seller’s point of view, if he could
change the bidding window rule. I also compare the results of these models with
the ones of an English auction benchmark, in terms of seller’s profit. Finally, I
use Section 6 to conclude and discuss further research in bidding fee auctions.
2. The Model
Consider a simple set-up with two potential buyers (1 and 2) and a passive
auctioneer, who intends to sell an object.7 The buyers value independently the
item: each has a valuation vi ∈ {vL, vH}, i = 1, 2, with 0 < vL < vH , which
can be seen as the monetary utility she8 derives from consuming the object.9
Initially, each vi is private knowledge of bidder i, who has only an expectation
θ1 on the rival’s type.
In this model, a round is a bidding decision moment for a given price. That
is, at any round t ∈ {1, 2, ...}, each bidder must choose an action out of the set
of possible actions bit = {0, 1}, choosing bit = 1 if she wants to bid or bit = 0 if
she would rather wait.
7For the sake of simplicity, I will assume the seller has zero reserve utility.
8Throughout the dissertation I will refer to each bidder as a “she” and to the seller as a
“he”.
9The existence of two different values can be interpreted as if there were two groups of
bidders: some who value the good less than the retail value (vL) and others that, even though
they value more, are only willing to pay up to the market price (vH). vH would be the object’s
market price.
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At any round t ≥ 2, a player will either be or not be on the lead. I define
the two possible states that bidders can hold throughout the auction:
Definition 1. The leader in a given round t ≥ 210 is the owner of the current
high bid.
Definition 2. A follower is any non-leader.
The state of a bidder in a given round depends on the actions taken by all
bidders in the preceding round. If a single bidder decides to bid at t, she will
become the leader at t + 1 for sure, while her rival will become the follower.
However, if both decide to bid (bit = 1∀i ∈ {1, 2}), the leader in the subsequent
round will be randomly chosen in a move by Nature. After no-one bidding
(bit = 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2}), the auction terminates and the current leader becomes the
auction’s winner. There is a non-refundable bidding fee c > 0 that must be paid
by the bidder whenever she submits a bid. The reserve price is assumed to be
zero and the price increment to be ε > 0.
In the following sections I present two variations of the model. The difference
between the two is the rule that the auctioneer uses for the bidding window.
The two rules are the following:
1. Sequential bidding auction: the bidding window has a maximum bidding
period.
2. Multiple round bidding auction: the bidding window has a fixed bidding
period.
In the first case, bidders have a time frame for submitting their bids. The
first one submitting a bid pays the bidding fee and becomes on the lead in
the following round. I call this rule “sequential bidding” because bidders have a
maximum time to place a bid, but as soon as a bid is submitted, the round moves
forward (the first one bidding becomes the following leader). In the multiple
round bidding variation, there are multiple successive fixed time frames to bid.
The round will only move forward by the end of the current bidding window
(the last one bidding will be the following leader). In both cases, if no one bids
before the countdown clock reaches zero, the auction closes and the current
leader wins.
10In the first round there is no leader nor follower: both bidders have the same neutral
state. In fact, at t = 1, all bidders could be seen as followers and the seller as the leader since
if no one bids he will keep the object.
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In the literature, these two rules have also been used. Hinnosaar (2010) and
Mittal (2010) define round as a moment in time in which all non-leading bidders
can either bid or wait. By their definition, the object’s price can increase by
Nε units in a single round, if N bidders decide to bid in that round (multiple
round bidding). Differently, Byers et al. (2010), Augenblick (2011) and Platt
et al. (2012) use a bidding window definition that resembles mine of a sequential
bidding auction.
These two hypothesis do not depart from reality and can illustrate different
bidding environments. A framework in which bidders react rapidly, being able to
instantaneously learn their rival’s action, would be equivalent to the sequential
bidding auction: immediately after the fastest player submitting a bid, her
rival (who could also be willing to bid) perceives that the price has increased
(i.e.: that they are in a new round) and makes a new bidding decision (for
the new price). A sequential bidding auction could also be an approximation
to a bidding fee auction with a long bidding window: since bidders have much
time to bid, the probability of almost simultaneous bids is very close to zero,
so bidders would have time to react to a rival’s action. On the other hand, a
framework in which bidders are slow-reacting, being unable to promptly see a
rival’s bid - either because the internet connection is slow or because bidders
bid almost simultaneously (due to a short bidding window, for instance) - would
be equivalent to the case of a multiple round bidding auction.
In both cases, I ignore the existence of a timer: in Appendix A.1 and Ap-
pendix B.1 I prove that introducing a countdown clock is unnecessary: it would
only complicate the model without making it more realistic.
A game will be defined by 5-tuple (c, ε, vH , vL, θ1), where c and ε are chosen
by the auctioneer, vH and vL are bidders’ characteristics and θ1 is a probability
distribution function. In the following two sections I will describe the equilib-
rium conditions for both the sequential bidding and the multiple round bidding
auctions.
3. Sequential Bidding Auction
This framework is the one which is, theoretically, supposed to happen in
reality. In a sequential bidding auction, the round moves forward immediately
after a bid is submitted. Hence, there is certainty regarding the item’s price in
a given round: in round t, the high bid is (t− 1)ε. I assume that if more than
one bidder chooses to bid, Nature will randomly select the following leader, and
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only her will have to pay the bidding fee.11 The price increases by ε in each
round.
In this section I present an equilibrium analysis of this model and then I
solve a parametrized example.
3.1. Equilibrium analysis
In any round, a bidder will choose the action that maximizes her expected
pay-off.
Let:
sit ∈ {f, l} be the state of bidder i in round t ≥ 2.
sit = l if bidder i is the leader at t.
sit = f if bidder i is a follower at t.
Let also uit(vi, sit) be the expected utility for bidder i in round t, if her state
is sit .
The game matrix in round t is summarized in Table 1:
Bidder i’s action Rival bids (bjt = 1) Rival waits (b
j
t = 0)









wait (bit = 0) ut+1(v
i, f) ueit
Table 1: Game matrix in round t
where uet is the pay-off bidder i will get if the game closes by the end of





i − tε if sit = l
0 if sit = f ∨ t = 1
The fact that, when a buyer successfully bids, she pays a non-refundable fee
c plays an important role in the equilibrium. Since c is sunk in each round,
the amount that was spent in previous bids is not taken into consideration in
current and further bidding decisions.12 Nevertheless, the current price and the
11This may seem unrealistic but it ends up being a good approximation with reality. The
two bidders may have decided to bid, but one was faster than the other placing the bid,
overcoming the rival. Nature plays the role of choosing the fastest bidder.
12Other authors, as Augenblick (2011) and Mittal (2010), include the amount invested in
bid costs in the bidders’ utility function.
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cost of placing an additional bid do matter. We identify two exit rounds, which
will be useful to find the equilibrium strategies of the game.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, a bidder of type x does not consider bidding in
any round t > vx−cε .
Proof. Let bjt+1 = 0. At t+1, a leader i of type x would win the auction and get
a gross utility of vx−tε. In the previous period, t, a buyer bids if and only if she
finds profitable to attempt to be on the lead in the following round, incurring
in an additional bidding fee. Then, vx − tε − c < 0 is a sufficient condition for
a bidder of type vx not to bid.
Definition 3. T ≡ bvL−cε c+ 1 and T ≡ b
vH−c
ε c+ 1 are the exit rounds for low
valuation and high valuation bidders, respectively.13
It is straightforward noticing that after t = T all the observed bids must
come from high value bidders. Moreover, if t = T is ever reached, we are sure
that the auction will end by the end of that period.14 Therefore, I can start the
backwards analysis at T , in order to find the equilibrium strategies of the game.
Since there is uncertainty regarding the valuation of the other bidder, the
extensive form of this game is one of incomplete information.15 I will use the
concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, specifying a probability distribution
(belief) for each player over the nodes in all information sets: in a given inform-
ation set, each player must have a belief about the rival’s type. For a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium to exist, the players’ actions must be optimal given their
beliefs and the rival’s strategy (Gibbons, 1992).
In my model, each player’s initial belief (i.e.: the ex-ante probability of a
high value bidder) is a probability mass function, where Pr(vi = vH |t = 1) ≡ θ1
and Pr(vi = vL|t = 1) ≡ 1 − θ1 , for i = 1, 2. 16 I consider the case of a
symmetric auction: both player’s types are drawn from the same distribution
function.
13b·c is the floor function. bαc gives the greatest integer lower or equal than α, for any
α ∈ R.
14At t = T it will not be profitable for anyone to bid. This means that the leader at T will
be the auction’s winner, getting a pay-off of vH − (T − 1)ε, net of all bidding costs incurred
in the previous rounds.
15This dynamic game of incomplete information can be converted to a dynamic game of
complete but imperfect information (Nature chooses the types of the bidders in the beginning
of the game, according to the probability distribution θ1). Then we use the subgame perfect
equilibria of this game as the solution concept.
16θ1 can also be interpreted as the share of bidders, in the universe of potential buyers, for
whom the object has a valuation vH .
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Given the current state of bidder j,17 bidder i updates her belief about
bidder j’s type through Bayes’ rule.18










t ) = Pr(v
j = vH |σjt ) =
=
Pr(sjt |vj = vH) · θ
j
t−1




t |vj = vL) · (1− θ
j
t−1)
for t ≥ 2 (1)
Definition 4. A belief system θ of this model assigns beliefs to all possible
nodes in all information sets.
In spite of choosing bit ∈ {0, 1}, bidders may bid with a given probability.
We can redefine the decision of bidder i to a probability of bidding.
Let ρit(σit) = ρit(sit, σit−1) ≡ Pr(bit = 1|vi∧σit), with vi ∈ {vH , vL} for t ≥ 2.19
Let ρi1 ≡ Pr(bi1 = 1|vi).
Let ρxt (σit) be the mixed strategy equilibrium probability of a bidder of type
vx bidding in round t.




t = f, σ
j
t−1) =
(2− ρHt−1) · θ
j
t−1
(2− ρHt−1) · θ
j




















Proof. At any round t ≥ 2, bidder j can be the follower either because she
waited or because she bid but Nature chose bidder i to be the leader instead.
However, if bidder j is the follower and the game is still active, bidder i must
17Since there are only two bidders and two possible states, conditioning the beliefs on the
state of bidder i or bidder j is the same.
18Beliefs both on and off the equilibrium path must be updated through Bayes’ rule




1) is the belief, for player i in round t, that player j is of the high
type, given all the past states of bidder j. For nodes that are reached with zero probability
Bayes’ rule cannot be used. In those cases any belief is admissible.






have bid. Therefore, the probability of bidder j being the follower given she is
of type vx ∈ {vH , vL} must be given by:
Pr(sjt = f |vj = vx ∧ bit = 1) =Pr(b
j
t−1 = 0|vj = vx) + 0.5Pr(b
j




Replacing this expression in Equation 1 gives us Equation 2.
Conversely, bidder j can only be the leader if she bid at t−1. The probability
of bidder j being the leader given she is of type vx depends on the action of
bidder i:
Pr(sjt = l|vj = vx ∧ bit = 0) =Pr(b
j




Pr(sjt = l|vj = vx ∧ bit = 1) =0.5Pr(b
j




Replacing either of these two expressions in Equation 1 gives us Equation
3.
Let ρ be any strategy profile of the game, specifying an action for each
player’s type and round. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game will be
given by a strategy profile ρ∗, which is optimal given a system of beliefs θ∗ and
the rival’s strategies. Let also V i(ρ|θ) be the expected pay-off of bidder i for
strategy profile of the game is ρ and belief system θ.
Each player’s strategy (ρi) must include an action for all possible nodes in
the game. A vL player’s strategy must have an action for each possible situation








Definition 5. There is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game if:
20At t = T a vL does not bid (bit = 0), regardless of the information set. The same applies
for vH bidders at t = T .
10
V i(ρ∗|θ∗) ≥ V i(ρi, ρ∗−i|θ∗) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
and θ determined by Bayes’ rule when possible.21
I look at two types of perfect Bayesian equilibria: symmetric and asymmet-
ric. Symmetric equilibria are equilibria in which bidders with the same valuation
and with the same information set bid similarly. The first round actions must
be ρi1 = ρH1 ∀vi = vH and ρi1 = ρL1 ∀vi = vL, with ρH1 ∈ [0, 1], ρL1 ∈ [0, 1]. No-one
is willing to deviate as long as they believe a rival of the same type is bidding
similarly and a rival of the other type (say type −x) is playing ρ−x1 .
On the contrary, in asymmetric equilibria, bidders with the same information
set bid differently. In this set-up bidders can only have the same information set
in the beginning of the first round. From round two onwards, their states differ,
meaning that they have different information sets. The first round equilibrium
actions are ρi1 = 0 for ρ
j
1 = 1 and ρ
i
1 = 1 for ρ
j
1 = 0, independently of the bidders
type. That is saying that a bidder is only willing to bid if she believes her rival
will not, and vice-versa. Note that there may be other types of asymmetric
equilibria, but I only focus on this one.
Next, I illustrate this model with a simple parametrized example. This
example does not strive to mimic an actual auction of a real object, but to show
that different equilibria may arise.
3.2. An example
Consider a parametrized family of examples of the previous model, with
0 ≤ θ1 ≤ 1, where bidders may have a valuation of either 2.5 or 4.5.22 Each bid
makes the price increase by a unit and the bidding fee is also unitary23 (Table
2).
For these specific values of the parameters, equilibria with the strategy pro-
files described in Table 3 may arise. It is not worth specifying vL’s actions
for t = T nor vH ’s actions for t = T : we are sure they wait in those rounds
(Proposition 1).
Table 3 includes all symmetric equilibria for any initial belief. Asymmetric
equilibria cannot be reached for the parameters values in this example.24 Figure
21See Appendix A.2.
22T = 2 and T = 4.
23It is very uncommon to have a price increment equal to the bidding fee. I set c = ε = 1
for the sake of simplicity.
24See Proposition 5, in Appendix A.2.
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Parameter Value
bidding fee c 1
price increment ε 1
low value vL 2.5
high value vH 4.5
Table 2: Parametrization
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Note: At t = T = 2, ρL2 (s2) = 0 ∀s2 ∈ {l, f} and at t = T = 4, ρH4 (σ4) = 0 ∀σ4.






















Figure 2: Seller’s expected revenue for all possible symmetric equilibria in a sequential bidding
model.
1 includes the intervals of θ1 for which equilibria a) to f) exist.
It is readily verifiable that there is at least a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for
each initial belief, except for beliefs in the interval [ 37 ,
3
5 ],
25 where there are none.
For θ1 ∈ ( 56 , 1] two equilibria co-exist, one in which everyone bids, independently
of the type, and another where bidders prefer not to start the auction. Different
equilibria lead to different revenues: the expected revenue for the seller is closely
dependent on the initial expectation, as it is shown in Fig. 2.
Let us consider a fully parametrized example, with θ1 = 0.85. Under this
initial belief we can have equilibria fitting in c) and d). I will characterize the
25By Nash’s theorem one can be sure that at least a Nash equilibrium exists.
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Pr. of win. Expected return
Eq. vL vH vL vH seller SW
c) 0.5 0.5 0.25 1.25 2 4.2
d) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4: Player’s probability of winning and expected pay-offs in the two equilibria under
θ1 = 0.85.
equilibria outcomes in terms of perceived (ex-ante) probability of winning and
expected utility for bidders of both types, seller’s revenue and social welfare.26
These results are in Table 4.
In equilibrium d) the object is not sold, leading to zero pay-offs for all in-
terested parties. In equilibrium c), however, the object is sold for sure and the
seller (with zero reserve utility) has a certain pay-off. The bidders’ pay-off is
uncertain, since it depends on the unpredictable action of Nature.
Even though equilibrium d) is Pareto superior to equilibrium d) (all risk
neutral agents are better off), anonymous bidders may not be able to cooperate
to choose one equilibrium over the other. If they were, the seller would encourage
that behaviour.
4. Multiple Round Bidding Auction
Section 3 described a model where the successful bidder of a given round
is the first to bid. However, in reality, it can happen that, for some reason
(short bidding window, almost simultaneous bids, low internet connection, etc.),
bidders are unable to promptly realize that a rival has placed a bid. Therefore,
several bids can be placed in the same round and uncertainty is brought in what
concerns the price of the object in the following round.27 In such a framework,
the successful bidder is the last one bidding in a round.
In this section I provide a model that tries to mimic this effect. The auction
is made of consecutive fixed time rounds, where any bidder can submit a bid.










E[V y ] + E[V z ]
)
, for y, z = {L,H} and x = {y, z}
27This effect is observed in penny auctions houses, when bidders concentrate their bids in
the ending seconds of a round. When several bidders bid almost simultaneously, rounds move
very quickly (the timer is restarted several times in a row), but because the change is so fast,
bidders perceive a unique (yet bigger) increase in the price.
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Thus, whenever a player decides to bid, she will have to pay the bidding cost
even if she does not become on the lead in the following round: the leader in
round t is randomly selected from the set of bidders who did bid at t− 1.28 In
the previous framework, the high bid in round t was tε. Now, a priori, we only
know that the price in the beginning of round t, pt, will be between (t − 1)ε
and 2(t − 1)ε, depending on the actions taken by the bidders in all previous
rounds.29
One could argue that the existence of a timer does matter in this framework,
stating that a bidder (who wants to submit a bid) prefers to wait until the last
tenth of a second of the round, in order try to be the last one bidding in that
round. However, if all bidders behave like this, the way I describe the model,
ignoring the timer, has a good fit with reality. In Appendix B.1 I prove that
using a timer in the model is indeed irrelevant.
4.1. Equilibrium analysis
The exit rounds for vH and vL bidders are as in Definition 1.
Let βit be the vector of actions of bidder i, from round 1 to t; ρit(sit, pt) be
the mixed strategy probability of bidder i bidding in round t, given her current
state and the current price; and µ1 be the initial probability of a high value
bidder.30





Pr[bjt−1|vj = vH ] · µ
j
t−1




t−1|vj = vj ] · (1− µ
j
t−1)
Since actions were partially unobservable31, in the previous section, the up-
dating rule depended on the state of the follower. In a multiple round bidding
auction model, actions are observable by the end of the round, so the updating
rule depends on the rival’s previous action.
28Now Nature plays the role of choosing the last one bidding in a round.
29If we are in round t − 1, we know that pt will be between pt−1 (if no-one bids at t − 1)
and pt−1 + 2ε (if both bid).
30I use µ1 rather than θ1, as in the previous framework, to point out that the belief system
of this model is different (it depends on a vector of actions instead of depending on a vector
of states), despite the meaning of the initial beliefs µ1 and θ1 being exactly the same.
31If two bidders decided to bid, the one who ended up being the leader in the following
round was not able to know if her rival had or had not also decided to bid.
15
Proposition 3. The Bayesian updating equation depends on the (visible) action
of bidder j in round t− 1:
µjt (b
j
t−1 = 0, β
j
t−2) =
(1− ρHt−1) · µ
j
t−1
(1− ρHt−1) · µ
j




















Proof. The equilibrium probability of a bidder of type vx bidding in round t−1 is




t−1, pt−1). Conversely, the probability





these in Equation 4, gives us Equation 5 and Equation 6, respectively.
The condition for the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is as follows:
Definition 6. There is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game if:
V i(ρ∗|µ∗) ≥ V i(ρi, ρ∗−i|µ∗) ∀i ∈ {1, 2}
and µ determined by Bayes’ rule when possible.32
Once more, both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria can occur.
4.2. An example
In order to later compare this model to the sequential bidding one, I use the
same parametrized example (Table 2).
In the multiple round auction, these parameter values allow for the existence
of both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. Table 5 includes all possible
symmetric equilibria of the game: equilibria in which bidders with the same
valuation and with the same information set bid similarly.
In the asymmetric equilibria of the game, a single potential buyer bids in
the first period, independently of the valuations of both. In this example, asym-
metric equilibria exist for µ1 ∈ [0, 13 ) and µ1 ∈ (
3
5 , 1] (Table 6).
Figure 3 shows that for more than sixty percent of the space of the initial




6 ] there are
32See Appendix B.2.
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2 (f, p2) ρ
H
2 (l, p2) ρ
H








0 if p3 = {3, 4}









0 if p2 = 1
1 if p2 = 2
0
0 if p3 = {3, 4}







0 if p2 = 1
1 if p2 = 2
0
0 if p3 = {3, 4}




, 1] 0 10
13µ1
0 if p2 = 1
1 if p2 = 2
0
0 if p3 = {3, 4}




, 1] 0 0 1 0
0 if p3 = {3, 4}
1 if p3 = 2
0
Note: At t = T = 2, ρL2 (s2, p2) = 0 ∀s2 ∈ {l, f}, ∀p2 and at t = T = 4, ρ
H
4 (s4, p4) = 0∀s4 ∈
{l, f}, ∀p4.
Table 5: Symmetric equilibrium strategy profiles for different initial beliefs, in a multiple
round bidding auction.





2 (f, p2) ρ
H
2 (l, p2) ρ
H






0 if ρj1 = 1
1 if ρj1 = 0
1 0
0 if p3 = {3, 4}





0 if ρj1 = 1
1 if ρj1 = 0
0 if p2 = 1
1 if p2 = 2 0
0 if p3 = {3, 4}
1 if p3 = 2
0
(∗) Equilibrium f) also needs the out of equilibrium belief 0 < µl2(b
j




Note: At t = T = 2, ρL2 (s2, p2) = 0 ∀s2 ∈ {l, f}, ∀p2 and at t = T = 4, ρ
H
4 (s4, p4) = 0∀s4 ∈
{l, f}, ∀p4.




Figure 3: Perfect Bayesian equilibria for each initial belief.
two possible equilibria; and for ( 56 , 1] three equilibria co-exist. As in Section
3.2, there is also a region of µ1 where there are no symmetric nor asymmetric
equilibria: [ 13 ,
3
5 ).
In the symmetric equilibria of this example, the object is always efficiently
allocated to the bidder who most values it. The same is not true in asymmetric
equilibria of type g): a vH follower at t = 2 waits, anticipating that if she did
bid and it was the case that her rival was also vH (which is true with a very high
probability), the latest would outbid her in the subsequent round, winning the
auction. The auction’s winner is the leader in the second round, independently
of the type.
Figure 4 shows, for all possible equilibria, how does the seller’s revenue vary
with the initial belief. The continuous line represents the seller’s revenue under
symmetric equilibria, while the dashed line shows the asymmetric equilibria’s
revenues.
To show, in greater detail, that different (yet simultaneous) equilibria can
have relevantly different results, not only in terms of revenue for the seller, but
also in terms of bidders’ pay-offs and social welfare, I use two fully parametrized
examples.
Example 1. µ1 = 0.2.
The two equilibria that exist under µ1 = 0.2 have different outcomes (Table
7). Equilibrium f) provides superior expected pay-offs to the seller and to vL
bidders. On the contrary, a vH bidder would rather be in an equilibrium of type
a). The fact that a vL is indifferent between bidding or waiting (mixing) in a),
gives her a zero expected utility, even if she ends up winning the auction (which






















Figure 4: Seller’s expected revenue for all possible symmetric (continuous line) and asymmetric
(dashed line) equilibria in a multiple round bidding model.
Pr. of win. Expected return
Eq. vL vH vL vH seller SW
a) 0.14 0.9 0 1.53 1.58 2.2
f) 0.4 0.9 0.1 1.45 2.48 3.22
Table 7: Probability of winning and expected pay-offs for the two equilibria that exist under
µ1 = 0.2. The asymmetric equilibrium results are assuming that both possible equilibria
(ρ11 = 1, ρ
2
1 = 0) and (ρ
1
1 = 0, ρ
2
1 = 1) have equal probability of occurrence. This is a
simplifying assumption to facilitate the comparison with the symmetric equilibrium.
19
Pr. of win. Expected return
Eq. vL vH vL vH seller SW
d) 0 0.56 0 0 4.26 4.26
e) 0 0 0 0 0 0
g) 0.5 0.5 0.25 1.25 2 4.2
Table 8: Probability of winning and expected pay-offs for the three equilibria that exist under
µ1 = 0.85. The asymmetric equilibrium results are assuming that both possible equilibria
(ρ11 = 1, ρ
2
1 = 0) and (ρ
1
1 = 0, ρ
2
1 = 1) have equal probability of occurrence. This is a
simplifying assumption to facilitate the comparison with the symmetric equilibrium.
efficient allocation of the item, it is also f) that leads to the greatest expected
social welfare.
Example 2. µ1 = 0.85
With this initial expectation, three perfect Bayesian equilibria are possible
(Table 8), including two symmetric: one where, at t = 1, only players with
high valuation may bid, using a mixed strategy action ρH1 =
200
221 (equilibrium
of type d)) and another in which no-one bids (equilibrium of type e)); and an
asymmetric equilibrium (type g)). The first one (type d)) is clearly the most
desired equilibrium for the seller, giving him an expected return close to the
high value. It is also the one that provides the greatest expected social welfare.
The second (type e)) has the most inefficient allocation possible: the agent that
least values the object (the seller) is the one who keeps it. The allocation of the
item in the equilibrium of type g) is random: the object will be sold, but the
winner can either be a high value or a low value bidder. Although, efficiency in
terms of allocation is not guaranteed, bidders of both high and low types are
better-off in this equilibrium than in any of the remaining two. Even though
the bidders’ favourite equilibrium is equilibrium d), society as a whole would
be worse-off if this equilibrium was the one being played: not only it can lead
to inefficient allocations, but also it is not the one that provides the greatest
expected overall welfare.
Coordination between anonymous bidders who do not know each other is
hardly plausible. However, in both examples, the bidders could gain if they
were able to implicitly collude. Even if a bidder intentionally loses an auction
by refraining from bidding, she could be compensated by her rival in further
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auctions. In Example 1, only bidders of equal types would agree to collude,
making collusion even less probable of occurring. The seller would be interested
in encouraging coordination by low value bidders, since they would choose the
seller’s favourite equilibrium. In Example 2, if bidders were able to implicitly
collude, they would harm not only the seller, but society as a whole. Neverthe-
less, implicit collusion is very unlikely to happen as we introduce more bidders
to the game.
5. Comparing the two rules
The two equilibria I derived in the previous sections try to describe the
behaviour of bidders under different bidding window rules. Even though it can
be argued that, in reality, the differences between the two frameworks should be
more due to bidders’ characteristics than due to a seller’s decision, throughout
the dissertation I modelled these differences as part of the auction’s design. The
bidding window rule (and also the bidding fee and the price increment) should
be set by seller, when designing the auction.
The case of a sequential bidding auction describes what should happen in a
perfect environment (the price moves up immediately after someone submitting
a bid). The multiple round bidding auction may seem more controversial, since
actual penny auctions do not have a fixed bidding time interval. However,
sometimes there can be a lag between the moment when a bidder submits a bid
and the moment when the remaining players become aware of that bid. It can
happen because bidders are away from each other, sometimes even in different
countries, and the internet signal does not move at the speed of light. This lag
is specially relevant in short bidding window auctions.
5.1. Choosing the right rule
Although the seller cannot explicitly choose one rule over the other (the mul-
tiple round bidding auction rule is never described in bidding fee auctions sites:
theoretically, the round should progress immediately after a bid is placed), he
can induce bidders’ behaviours similar to the ones described in the two models.
As I mentioned in Section 2, for very short bidding windows, it is likely that
bidders behave as in the multiple round bidding auction, while in auctions with
longer windows, bidders may behave more similarly to how it was described in
the sequential bidding auction. Then, one can approximate the bidding window

















Probability of a high value bidder
English
Figure 5: Seller’s revenue in the sequential and in the multiple round bidding auction models,
comparing with an English auction benchmark.
as the owner of the server that keeps the auction house online, is able to overload
or alleviate it. If the server is slow, bidders will not be able to see instantaneous
price rises, and will act as in the model of Section 4. On the other hand, if
the server is fast, bidders act as described in Section 3. I assume that bidders
entering the auction house’s website are able to tell which bidding window rule
is being used.33
Using the parametrized example in Table 2, I check which bidding window
rule is more profitable for the seller. Figure 5 overlaps Figure 2 and Figure
4 and it stresses the differences in terms of seller’s revenue between the two
models. For an initial belief in [0, 25 ) the seller prefers designing the bidding
fee auction with sequential bidding. However, for [ 25 , 1], the seller’s expected
revenue is higher in the multiple round bidding auction.
There is a match between the sequential auction’s symmetric equilibrium and
the multiple round auction’s asymmetric equilibrium revenues in the interval
[0, 13 ). The same is true for (
3
5 , 1]. It is due to the fact that both a multiple
round bidding asymmetric equilibrium and a sequential bidding equilibrium
allow a unique bid submission in the first period.
If the auctioneer has the possibility of changing the bidding window rule, she
33E.g.: if there is a short bidding window period and the page is taking too long to load,
they assume they are in a multiple round auction.
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can profit from it, by choosing the most appropriate rule for a given initial belief.
The existence of such a mechanism would also enable at least a (symmetric or
asymmetric) perfect Bayesian equilibrium for all initial beliefs, in my example.
5.2. Comparing with the English auction
But should the seller auction off her object using a bidding fee auction mech-
anism? I also compare the outcome of the bidding fee auctions with the one
of a standard English auction. The English auction is a good benchmark since
it leads to efficient outcomes. For the same parametrized example, the English
auction equilibrium is straightforward: if there are two bidders with the same
valuation, one will be the winner, paying her entire willingness to pay (vH = 4.5
or vL = 2.5); if there is a bidder of each type, the vH will be the winner, paying
her rival’s valuation, plus an infinitesimal: vL + δ, with δ → 0+. The English
auction would provide the seller with an expected revenue of 2.5 + 2θ21. This
revenue’s curve is also represented in Figure 5.
For beliefs in ( 14 ,
3
5 ), the bidding fee auction (with the optimal bidding win-
dow rule) is strictly better than the English auction. In its turn, the English
auction dominates both bidding fee auction variations for beliefs in the interval
[0, 14 ) and for beliefs greater than
√
595
676 ≈ 0.94. For other initial expectations,
nothing can be said, since it depends on the probability of happening each of
the multiple bidding fee auction’s equilibria. Assuming each equilibrium has
the same probability of occurring, the bidding fee auction would underperform.
The Revenue Equivalence Theorem (Vickrey, 1961) does not hold in bidding
fee auctions since (i) the set of possible values is discrete, (ii) it is not true
that the bidder with the highest value is always the auction’s winner, (iii) it
is not true that the bidder with the lowest value expects always zero surplus.
Nevertheless it is still interesting that an allocation mechanism based on discrete
price increments and in costly bids can sometimes lead to higher profits.
6. Concluding Remarks
This dissertation included two risk-neutral approaches to bidding fee auc-
tions with independent private values. One where the first bidder submitting a
bid in a given round was the only one supporting the bidding fee, becoming on
the lead in the subsequent round; and another, where each round’s successful
bidder was the last submitting a bid. The two models are not incompatible.
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Rather, they complement each other: both strive to explain what happens in
real penny auctions, but in different circumstances.
The extremely high unpredictability of these auctions’ returns, described in
the media (McCarthy, 2011) and in other working papers on the topic (Hin-
nosaar, 2010) motivated me to analyze a model of private values and check if
bidding fee auctions could present multiple equilibria. My dissertation’s conclu-
sion is that they are likely to have it. By generating multiple equilibria, these
auctions generate different expected revenues: the models I developed led to
multiple perfect Bayesian equilibria with quite different outcomes (at least for
a specific family of parameters).
Both the sequential bidding auction and the multiple round bidding auction
models may lead to inefficient allocation, either because the object is not sold
(and there are bidders with positive willingnesses to pay) or because the object
is indeed sold, but the winning bidder is not the one who most values it.
Also, the seller’s revenue is not independent of the bidding window rule: the
auctioneer can profit from changing the rule according to the beliefs about the
buyers’ types. In the parametrization equilibria I constructed, there is a region,
where the probability of high valuation bidders is lower, for which the seller
gains from using the sequential bidding auction rule. On the other hand, if the
probability of high valuation bidders is higher, the seller should use the multiple
round bidding auction rule.
I also compared bidding fee auctions with the English auction. Even though
I had mixed results, in my example, bidding fee auctions could outperform the
English auction.
It is not my dissertation’s aim to make general conclusions on bidding fee
auctions, besides that my findings are possible to happen. I use a parsimoni-
ous model of only two bidders, where all agents (bidders and seller) are risk
neutral and my analysis is focused only on symmetric and on a specific type
of asymmetric equilibria. If I had checked for the existence of other types of
equilibria, some of my conclusions could have changed. Another limitation of
my model is that even though I allow different bidders’ valuations, by setting
the seller’s reserve utility to zero, I do not let bidders to value the good less
than the auctioneer. I also assumed discrete valuations, rather than continuous,
which are more likely to happen in reality.
This topic is far from being closed. Further studies should also include a
private values analysis with more than two bidders (potentially assuming leader
passivity) and it would also be interesting to introduce Byers et al. (2010)’s
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asymmetries into the model.
Appendix A. Sequential Bidding Auction
Appendix A.1. Timer
In this section I prove that introducing a timer in the sequential bidding
auction model is irrelevant.
Definition 7. Let round t be a time interval between [t, t+ 1).
Consider the case in which more than a person could be willing to submit a
bid. In this framework, the successful bidder in each round would be the fastest
submitting her bid.
Let t ≤ ςit < t + 1 be the action of bidder i, regarding the bidding moment
in the tth bidding decision.
Proposition 4. All bidders willing to bid try to submit a bid at instant ςit = t.
Proof. I prove that there is no profitable deviation. Consider the problem of a
bidder who is willing to bid in round t.
Her utility in the following round is given by:
uit+1 =

uit+1(l)− c if b
j

















t = 1 ∧ ςit > ς
j
t
It is impossible to bid at ςit < t. A possible deviation must be ςit > t,















t+1(l)− c), once uit+1(l)− c ≥ uit+1(f)
(the bidder is willing to bid).
In my model, I do not take into consideration aggressive bidding strategies
nor other types of strategies that could, for instance, use the bidding timing to
signal private values.
Appendix A.2. Obtaining the equilibrium actions
This appendix gives a more detailed explanation about how the equilibria
in Section 3 were found.
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j , sjt ), s
j
t+1)∀vj ∈ {vH , vL}, ∀s
j
t+1 ∈ {f, l}
where the ending utility ueit is equal to vi − (t− 1)ε if bidder i is the leader
at t or 0 if she is the follower, θ is the belief system, sjt = s
−i




The perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game are achieved by solving this
programme for all possible nodes. We can substitute the constraint equations
directly into the objective function (in uit+1, which depend on the equilibrium
actions at t + 1, which depend on θjt+1) and compute its first order condition.
Since the programme is linear in ρit, the F.O.C. will lead to either corner solu-
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dV it
dρit
> 0, ρit = 0 if
dV it
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Appendix A.3. Equilibria of the numerical example
At t = 4, a vL is out of the game and a vH will wait for sure (T = 4), so we
move back to t = 3.
At t = 3, u4(vH , l) = 4.5−3−1 = 0.5 and u4(vH , f) = 0. Substituting these
values in (A.1), computing its first order condition and solving for θj3, leads to












1 if θj3(f, s
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t−1) ∈ ( 89 , 1]





0 if θj3(f, s
j
t−1) ∈ [0, 89 )
u3(vH , f, s
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t−1) ∈ [0, 89 ]
This means that if, by chance, bidders reach t = 3, they may face one of
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, 1] 0 0 0 3.5
2.5 ( 8
9
, 1] [0, 8
9
) 0 0 0 3.5
2.6 ( 8
9
, 1] ( 8
9
, 1] 0 0 0 3.5
Note: 2.1 and 2.2 lead to 3.1; 2.3 and 2.4 lead to 3.2; 2.5 leads to 3.3 and 2.5
leads to 3.4
Table A.10: Equilibrium actions and pay-offs at t = 3, depending on the leader’s beliefs about
the follower.
Moving back to t = 2, the equilibrium actions depend not only on the value
of θj2(s
j
2) but also on the expectation of reaching each of the four situations in
Table A.9.
Replacing the utilities of each case in (A.1) and solving the programme
subject to (2) and (3) evaluated at t = 3, leads to the equilibrium situations at
t = 2, in Table A.10.
At t = 1, besides vH bidders, vL may also be willing to bid. We solve the
programme for both types of bidders, considering the four situations that can
occur at t = 2, for a vH . Then we check for the existence of symmetric equilibria,
and we get the equilibrium strategy profiles in Table 3.
In what concerns the existence of asymmetric equilibria in this framework,
it can be claimed that no equilibrium is possible.
Lemma 1. It is necessary and sufficient for an asymmetric equilibrium to exist,
that ui2(vi, l)− ui2(vi, f) < c < u2(l), ∀vi ∈ {vL, vH}.
Proof. Consider the programme in Appendix A.2 and a candidate equilibrium
with ρi1 = 1 and ρ
j
1 = 0.
For the one who is bidding not willing to deviate, the expected utility of
bidding must be higher than the expected utility of deviating (i.e. waiting):
ui2(f)− c > 0.
For the one who is waiting, the inverse should be true, leading to ui2(f) >
ui2(l)− c.
These two inequalities together, lead to the condition above.
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Proposition 5. There is no asymmetric equilibrium of the model, for the para-
metrized example in Section 3.2.
Proof. Consider uH2 (l) and uH2 (f) in Table A.10.
Lemma 1 is never verified for a vH .
Appendix A.4. Seller’s revenue
The seller’s revenue is equal to the winning bid plus the fees of all bids that
were placed during the auction. Let tf be the final round of the auction (the
first round in which bit = 0, ∀i). The seller’s revenue is:
SR(tf ) = (tf − 1)(c+ ε)




Pr(bit = 0,∀i) · (t− 1)(c+ ε)
Appendix A.4.1. Seller’s revenue in the example
Table A.11 shows what is the seller’s revenue in each of the six possible
equilibria.
Appendix B. Multiple Round Bidding Auction
Appendix B.1. Timer
Definition 8. Let round t be a time interval between (t− 1, t].
In this framework, the successful bidder would be the last-one bidding in a
given round.
Let t − 1 < ςit ≤ t be the action of bidder i, regarding the bidding moment
in the tth bidding decision.
Proposition 6. All bidders willing to bid try to submit a bid at instant ςit = t.
Proof. I prove that there is no profitable deviation. Consider the problem of a
bidder who is willing to bid in round t.
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It is impossible to bid at ςit > t. A possible deviation must be ςit < t, which















t+1(l, pt+ ε)− c), since
uit+1(l, pt + 2ε)− c ≥ uit+1(f, pt + 2ε) (the bidder is willing to bid).
Appendix B.2. Obtaining the optimal actions
In each round, a bidder chooses ρit to maximize her expected utility, given
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Appendix B.3. Equilibria of the numerical example
At t = 4, a vL is out of the game and a vH will wait for sure (T = 4), so we












3 (f, p3) ρ
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2 [0, 1] [0, 1] 1 0 0.5 2.5− 2.5µf3
3 [0, 1] [0, 1] 0 0 0 1.5
4 [0, 1] [0, 1] 0 0 0 0.5











2 (f, p3) ρ
H
2 (l, p3) u
H





) [0, 1] 1 0 1.5− 2.5µl2 2.5− 2.5µ
f
2
1 ( 35 , 1] [0, 1] 0 0 0 1.5
2 [0, 1] [0, 1] 1 0 0.5 2.5− 2.5µf2
Table B.13: Equilibrium actions and pay-offs for t = 2.
At t = 3, u4(vH , l) = 4.5− p3 − 1 = 3.5− p3 and u4(vH , f) = 0. Moreover,
at t = 3, p3 can take different values: p3 = 2 if a bid alone was placed in each
of the previous two rounds, p3 = 3 if in one of the two preceding rounds both
bidders did bid and p3 = 4 if there were two bids in both rounds. Note that
p3 cannot be lower than 2, for t = 3 to be reached (otherwise, it would mean
that in one preceding round no bid was placed and the game would have ended




t is the vector of past bidding actions of the bidder whose






t ) is the belief of bidder i about bidder j’s type, if bidder
j’s state at t is sjt .
Each bidder’s strategy must have an action for round t = 3, for all possible
p3. We solve the programme in Appendix B.2 for all possible prices and for the
two states. Results are in Table B.12.
Moving back to t = 2, p2 ∈ {1, 2}, depending on how many bids there were
in t = 1. We solve again B.1 for a vH leader and follower, considering the utility
values in Table B.12 to found the equilibrium actions of this period. Results are
in Table B.13.
At t = 1, vL bidders might also bid. Depending on µ1, seven different
equilibria are possible (Tables 5 and 6).
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Appendix B.4. Seller’s revenue
Let tf be the final round of the auction (the first round in which bit = 0, ∀i).
In this model, the revenue for the seller is given by:


















Appendix B.4.1. Seller’s revenue in the example
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